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The purpose of this study is to examine the validity of Prof. Inoue's 
view which stresses the role of the byzantine aristocrat's olkos (household 
organization which includes the estates and the retainers) as a driving 
force of the rebellion of lsaakios Komnenos. I have a number of doubts 
about Prof. Inoue's view. First, is it possible to argue that the regular army 
was opposed to the aristocrat's private soldiers? Secondly, had the 
aristocrats' groups of private soldiers the same close connection to the 
management of aristocrat oikos? If anything, they seem to have been 
connected to aristocrats' position as high-ranking military officials. It 
seems more likely that they formed a small guard corps around the 
aristocrats' role as high-ranking military officers rather than being formed 
through their connections with the aristocrats' estate management. If this 
is the case, then thirdly, it is doubtful whether they had the military 
strength to determine the success of the rebellion as a separate entity from 
the state armies. Finally, as a fourth problem, we need to examine if, as 
Prof. Inoue says, the sheer number of private soldiers was main cause 
determining the importance of revel leaders, and whether such a condition 
became the basis of Skylitzes' selection when he named the rebel families. 
Our final conclusion is that the number of aristocrats' private soldiers 
was not the decisive factor in selecting the leaders of the revolting armies. 
The rebellion of lsaakios Komnenos was the one of generals who could 
mobilize military forces stationed in Asia Minor. The precedence of 
leaders in the rebellion greatly depended on their careers in the state 
apparatus, such as their honorary titles and past military exploits. On the 
other hand, we could not determine any evidence that the scale of their 
household was considered. 
Keywords: Byzantium, the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople, Isaakios I 
Komnenos, Byzantine Aristocratic Families 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Letters, Kanazawa University 
Vol. XLI 2006 41 
Introduction 
In 1057, generals from Asia Minor dissatisfied by the cold treatment of the 
emperor Michael VI (r.l 056-1 057) rose in revolt against the imperial 
government of Byzantium. The rebels took power after they defeated the 
imperial troops and forced Michael VI to abdicate. Isaakios Komnenos, whom 
the rebels had selected as their emperor, formally ascend to the throne (=Isaakios 
I Komnenos, 1057-1059). 
For this political change, past studies have concentrated on locating the 
revel leadership in history. For instance, G. Ostrogorsky has located them in the 
Asia Minor military aristocrats' resistance to the civil aristocrats' government of 
Michael VI. 1 On the other hand, S. A. Kamer considers this case in terms of a 
counteroffensive from the aristocracy, both civilian and military groups, to 
Michael VI, who had attempted to exclude the power of aristocrats. 2 In addition, 
according to J.-C. Cheynet, it was a confrontation of an imperial government 
that controlled the Balkans and the .Midwest region of Asia Minor, and rebels 
that were based in eastern Asia Minor. 3 
These research results can be quickly seen to share in common an emphasis 
on the struggle for power between the imperial government and the revolting 
aristocrats. On the other hand, it was generally believed that, as far as the forces 
the rebelling aristocrats led were concerned, forces stationed in Asia Minor were 
mobilized on a large scale. 
To such a theory, a novel view was presented by Prof. K.lnoue. 4 He 
stresses the role of the aristocrat's oikos (household organization which includes 
the estates and the retainers) as a driving force of the revolt. Conversely, the role 
of the regular army remained limitedly in his view. In evidence, he discusses the 
fact that Katakalon Kekaumenos, one of the leaders of the rebels, took pains to 
mobilize the state army and succeeded in it only by a stratagem, and that 
Bryennios trying to obtain his soldier's respect, was suspected by his colleague, 
arrested, and finally relieved of his post. According to Prof. K. Inoue, it was 
difficult to mobilize the state army to rebel against the reigning emperor. 
If so, what is the main factor that led the rebels to victory? Prof. Inoue 
identifies it in the aristocrats' private retainers' troops. According to him, in 
actuality, it was powerful aristocrats with powerful oikos that played the main 
role in the revolt. In contrast, he thought that the aristocrats who did not have 
such oikos were not able to play important role at that time. As an evidence of 
his theory, he paid attention that members of the Dalassenoi did not appear in 
this revolt. 
The Dalassenoi was the powerful military aristocratic family who had 
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supplied many military commanders in the first half of the 11th century.5 
However, after the downfall of Konstantinos Dalassenos, suspected of plotting 
in 1034, and the same fate falling on his brothers Theophylaktos and Romanos 
due to the same crime and losing their property in circa 1038-1039, the 
prosperity of this family declined greatly. Prof. Inoue explains the reason why 
members of the Dalassenoi did not appear in this revolt by the following 
argument. First possibility is quite simply that they did not actually participate in 
the revolt. Prof. Inoue rejects this theory because the Dalassenoi had close 
relations with the Komnenoi and the Doukai, ringleaders of the revolt, and that a 
member of this family would occupy the important post of militarily commander 
in the government of Isaakios I that would be organized after the success of the 
revolt. So, despite the fact that members of the Dalassenoi did participate in the 
rebellion, why has their presence not been mentioned? 
Prof. Inoue's view is as follows: Ioannes Skylitzes, the principal historian 
on the rebellion, was supportive of the military aristocrats participating in this 
intrigue and he attempted to list up all of the participants. In this case, all the 
leaders ofthe revolt whom Skylitzes referred to were owners of important oikos. 
It was such aristocrats who had led rebels in the battle ofHaides in August 1057. 
The 'rivaling emperor' Isaakios Komnenos, who commanded the center of the 
army, had oikos in Kastamon, Paphlagonia, where rebels had concentrated. 
Katakalon Kekaumenos, who commanded the left wing, could mobilize I ,000 
private soldiers in Koloneia, his homeland. Romanos Ski eros, commander of the 
right wing, had got involved in a private war with another aristocrat in his 
homeland in the Anatolikoi in 1042. In addition, the name of Nikephoros 
Botaneiates, who known to have led private forces as the doux of Antioch in 
1067 is also mentioned. Prof. Inoue's conclusion is that the ruined Dalassenoi, 
who had lost their oikos and could not play any important role in the revolt, had 
no value worth mentioning. 
If this view is accepted, the power bases of the aristocrats who fomented 
the revolt would be not in the capital but the provinces, and the basis of their 
power would not be regular imperial armies stationed in the provinces but their 
own estates and private soldiers. 
I have a number of doubts about Prof. Inoue's view, however. First, is it 
possible to argue that the regular army was opposed to the aristocrat's private 
soldiers (that is, the interpretation that while the central government firmly 
controlled forces stationed in the provinces, the revolting aristocrats could rely 
only on their private soldiers)? Secondly, had the aristocrats' groups of private 
soldiers the same close connection to the management of aristocrat oikos? If 
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anything, they seem to have been connected to aristocrats' position as high-
ranking military officials. I get this impression because we can confirm that 
actual private soldiers mentioned in fragmental historical sources were originally 
foreign mercenaries or prisoners of war, or came from different areas from their 
master's homeland. It seems more likely that they formed a small guard corps 
around the aristocrats' role as high-ranking military officers rather than being 
formed through their connections with the aristocrats' estate management. If this 
is the case, then thirdly, it is doubtful whether they had the military strength to 
determine the success of the rebellion as a separate entity from the state armies. 
Rather, it seems more likely that their existence remained a kind of status 
symbol of aristocrat's social prestige as a high-ranking military officer. Finally, 
as a fourth problem, we need to examine if, as Prof. Inoue says, the sheer 
number of private soldiers (i.e., whether or not the aristocrat in question 
possessed powerful oikos) was main cause determining the importance of revel 
leaders, and whether such a condition became the basis of Skylitzes' selection 
when he named the rebel families. In other words, we need to make clear 
whether Skylitzes took other elements into consideration when he judged 
someone as a key figure. For that reason, we must analyze his text in detail. 
Now, let us try to clarify these problems. 
I. Imperial Regular Army and Aristocrat's Private Forces 
Is it possible to clearly distinguish aristocrat private forces from the regular 
imperial army? In my opinion, it is difficult. We cannot disregard the natural 
feeling of solidarity that existed between military forces stationed in the 
provinces and aristocrats with estates in the same region. 
Let us consider the case with Bryennios that Prof. Inoue used as an 
example of a failure to take over the regular army. 6 At that time Bryennios 
occupied the post of strategos of Cappadocia and strategos-autokrator of the 
Makedonian tagmata. 7 Determined to join the rebellion and lacking strong ties 
with his soldiers, he set about securing his soldiers' support with higher-than 
regulation pay. His suspicious behavior was noticed by his co-general, 
Lykanthes, the strategos of the Anatolikoi, and he was arrested, and punished by 
blinding, by Lykanthes. 
Reviewing the text referring to this incident, we will find that it was "the 
Cappadocians" to whom Bryennios tried to pay additional salaries. 8 If he felt no 
need of such a procedure with the Makedonian tagmata he led from his 
homeland, it means he must have had strong ties with these troops already. 
If this hypothesis is accepted, it seems implausible that Bryennios' 
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Makedonian troops did not even show any pretense of resistance at his arrest. It 
is difficult to discuss this point conclusively on the basis of solid documentary 
sources, but it seems likely that the action of Lykanthes' troupe was so quick 
(they swiftly surrounded the tent of Bryennios and arrested him) that the 
Makedonian troops lost their chance to counterattack. Based on that, the arrested 
Bryennios was blinded immediately, without any request for the emperor's 
instructions.9 It is likely that such precautionary measures were taken because 
they feared the Makedonian troops would attempt his recapture. 
Michael VI's government recognized that generals from Makedonia and the 
army corps of the same province were connected by strong bonds. When the 
emperor called up the troops in Makedonia to rebuff the rebels, it was Basileios 
Tarchaneiotes, a member of the Tarchaneiotai, as powerful as the Bryennioi in 
Makedonia, that the emperor entrusted the command of this army. 10 In fact, this 
is the first time that the top post of the Western army was entrusted to an 
aristocrat from Makedonia. Perhaps the imperial government tried to use of the 
popularity of the Tarchaneiotai to calm down the shake up that Bryennios' arrest 
had brought to the Western army. 
It is known that two generals, Maurokatakalon and Katzamountes, were in 
the Makedonian troops under the command of Basileios Tarchaneiotes. 11 It is 
acknowledged that members of the Maurokatakaloi were military commanders 
playing active parts in Balkans from the latter half of 11th century. There is 
some circumstantial evidence that this family had a connection with this region. 
For example, Nikolaos Maurokatakalon had contributed an icon to the church in 
Adrianople in the 121h Century. 12 Meanwhile, J.-C.Cheynet connects the 
Katzamountes family with the lineage of a family of certain Koutzomites that 
participated in Nikephoros Bryennios' (son of Bryennios, rebel of 1057) revolt 
in 1077. There is no reason to doubt that they also belonged to the local nobility 
that maid Makedonia their homeland. 13 
From these cases, it is likely that regular army stationing in provinces was 
generally commanded by the group · of officers coming from same locality. It 
seems that powerful aristocrats having their base in the province ware able to 
assert their influence to the regular provincial army through their connections 
with military officers from the same region although the chief officer of the 
district was often sent from the central government. 
We would like to turn now to the process of troop mobilization by 
Katakalon Kekaumenos. This case has been thought of as an example of a 
success story in controlling regular soldiers with severe difficulty. If we examine 
the text of Skylitzes in detail again, we will find out that the depiction of 
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dichotomy between the group of private soldiers faithful to the revolting 
aristocrats and the regular army that was hard to win over is an excessively 
simplified interpretation. In actuality, a third group, that blurred the boundaries 
between the first two groups, also existed. Following to Skylitzes' description, 14 
we would like to reconstruct Kekaumenos' process of assembling an army, by as 
follows. 
First, he revealed the plot to his dependents and relatives, and gathered 
1 ,000 soldiers. They were the most reliable men, whom Kekaumenos believed 
they would unconditionally follow him in any situation. Next, he revealed the 
plan to "men of high reputation of the region" (notables of the region) and, won 
them to his cause one by one. Then he approached "the people who were braver 
and more suitable for soldiers" (leading officers of local armies or military 
aristocrats retiring from military posts at that time, like Kekaumenos?) by a 
similar method, and added them as his allies. We should notice that Kekaumenos 
fully divulged his plot, and was securing their cooperation without resorting to 
any subterfuge. 
After that, Kekaumenos fabricated an imperial letter appointing him as 
commander of the force to subdue the Turks, and called up the army corps of the 
surrounding regions on that authority. As regards the local corps, those of 
Koloneia and Chaldia, he urged officers to choose beheading or participation in 
the plot, and won their support. And for three army corps of foreign mercenaries 
(one was Russian and the other two, Frankish), he threatened them, bound them 
by an oath, and forced them to submit to his plan. Next, Kekaumenos put all 
troops in the vicinity under his command. In addition, "archontes and soldiers of 
Sebasteia, Melitene, Thephrike and the rest of Armenia" gathered under his flag. 
And the tagma of Armeniakoi and leading officers of that theme also joined his 
army on the way to the west. 
From the above description, we can confirm that "men of high reputation 
of the region" (notables of the region) and "the people who were braver and 
more suitable for soldiers" (ex-soldiers?) existed between Kekaumenos' private 
army (men obeying his command unconditionally) and the imperial regular army 
(soldiers whose cooperation was difficult to obtain by the rebels without tricks). 
We can say with fair certainty that they were ruling elites in the local society and 
had a huge influence over their people. Therefore, it is clear that if their support 
could be secured, it would greatly contribute to unification of public sentiment 
in the region in favor of the revolt. It would not be easy for troops stationed in 
provinces (as already seen, many of the leading officers came from same region) 
to disregard such a public sentiment and to remain loyal to the imperial 
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government. 
If we accept that, we can then conclude that Kekaumenos' stratagem 
forging the emperor's letter was a skillful strategy that aimed to concentrate the 
various army corps that lay scattered in the vicinity, and to win them over all at 
once as a group, rather than as a last resort plan thought out because of the 
difficulty in winning over the regular army. It is clear from the example of 
Bryennios' arrest that it was a dangerous gamble for a revel leader to gather 
noncommittal troops in one place. It seems that Kekaumenos dared such a bold 
stratagem because he had full confidence of success in the persuasion of military 
leaders in the provinces, from having obtained the local notables' support. 
With the exception of the case of Kekaumenos, Skylitzes was not talking 
about the actual process of mobilizing the rebel army. However, by reading his 
description carefully, we can obtain a few fragmentary nuggets of information. 
The first is the attitude of Lykanthes, strategos of the Anatolikoi. When 
rebels marching toward the capital arrived at Nikaia, Isaakios Komnenos 
permitted the evacuation of the officers and enlisted men who hoped to remain 
loyal to the reigning emperor, Michael VI. We find that Lykanthes, 
"commanding the tagmata of Anatolikoi" appears among three military leaders 
who ran to Michael VI's camp at this time. 15 Lykanthes, who had arrested 
Bryennios, was compelled, against his will, to join the rebels by this time. Why 
was he, the commander of a powerful force, swallowed by the rebels without 
any resistance? Is it because rebel army grew so large so fast that they could 
overwhelm his men so quickly? But such a view is hard to imagine if one takes 
into consideration that the rebels were compelled to break up their revolt earlier 
than planned and that at the time of the uprising, Kekaumenos' troops had not 
yet joined. It may be quite likely that he could not help going with the tide as a 
result of his isolation within his troops. The conditions at that time are 
demonstrated by a phrase of Skylitzes. When Lykanthes had arrested Bryennios, 
Skylitzes added the following proviso: "because he (=Lykanthes) did not know 
ofthe consultation by archontes in the East." 16 
As J.-C.Cheynet pointing out, he did not belong to a famous noble family. 17 
He may have been one of the "Newcomers", who were promoted by the imperial 
government of Michael VI, who was trying to exclude members of powerful 
aristocratic families from important military posts. As a man without ties to local 
society, he was not bound by vested interests in the region, so it seems that he 
was a suitable candidate to carry out the wishes of the central government. 
However, on the other hand, as he was an "outsider" in the region, there was a 
risk that he might be alienated by leading officials, who for the most part were 
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m e n  f r o m  t h e  r e g i o n .  A c t u a l l y ,  h e  r e m a i n e d  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  t h e  p l o t  p l a n ,  w h i c h  
h a d  b e e n  c i r c u l a t i n g  i n  s e c r e t  a m o n g  t h e  p o w e r f u l  a r i s t o c r a t s  i n  t h e  E a s t .  
A t  a  s t a g e  w h e r e  t h e  f u l l  s c o p e  o f  t h e  r e v o l t  h a d  n o t  y e t  r e v e a l e d  i t s e l f ,  i t  
c a n  b e  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  r e a s o n  f o r  s o l d i e r s  o f  t h e  A n a t o l i k o i  t o  h e s i t a t e  
t o  a r r e s t  B r y e n n i o s  t h e  " M a k e d o n i a n " ,  a  s t r a n g e r  t o  t h e m ,  e i t h e r .  B u t  i t  i s  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  d o u b t f u l  w h e t h e r  t h e y  c o u l d  t a k e  u p  a r m s  w i t h o u t  a n y  h e s i t a t i o n  
a g a i n s t  S k l e r o s  a n d  B o u r t z e s ,  t h e i r  c o - r e s i d e n t s  e s c a p e d  t o  K a s t a m o n .  R a t h e r ,  
t h e  g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  o f  t r o o p s  i n  t h i s  d i s t r i c t  w o u l d  d e c i d e  t o  j o i n  t o  t h e  r e v o l t  a t  
t h e  s t a g e  w h e r e  m a n y  o f  t h e  p o w e r f u l  a r i s t o c r a t s  i n  t h e  A n a t o l i k o i  h a d  a l r e a d y  
j o i n e d .  C o m m a n d e r  L y k a n t h e s  w o u l d  n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  r e s i s t  t h e  c o n s e n s u s  o f  h i s  
t r o o p s .  
T h e  s a m e  p o i n t  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  I s a a k i o s  K o m n e n o s  a n d  t h e  
t r o o p s  o f  P a p h l a g o n i a ,  h i s  h o m e l a n d .  A l l  s o u r c e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  S k y l i t z e s ,  d o  n o t  
m e n t i o n  a t  a l l  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n o r  o f  P a p h l a g o n i a ,  w h o  c o m m a n d e d  
a r m i e s  s t a t i o n e d  i n  t h a t  p r o v i n c e ,  n o r  t h o s e  o f  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  o f  B u k e l l a r i o i  o r  
O p s i k i o i .  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  L y k a n t h e s  i n  A n a t o l i k o i ,  i t  w a s  l i k e l y  t h a t  a  
l o c a l  a r m y ,  i n c l u d i n g  c h i e f  o f f i c i a l s ,  w e n t  o v e r  s m o o t h l y  t o  t h e  r e b e l s  w i t h o u t  
a n y  f r i c t i o n .  T h e r e  i s  a  c i r c u m s t a n t i a l  e v i d e n c e  t o  p r o v e  l o c a l  s o c i e t y  w a s  
f r i e n d l y  t o  t h e  r e b e l s .  A f t e r  t h e  r i s i n g  o f  t h e  r e b e l l i n g  a r m y ,  I s a a k i o s  d i s p a t c h e d  
h i s  f a m i l y  a n d  p r o p e r t y  t o  s a f e t y  i n  t h e  P e m o r i s s a  f o r t r e s s  o n  t h e  c l i f f  o n  t h e  
b a n k s  o f  t h e  r i v e r  H a l u s .
1 8  
S e e i n g  t h a t  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  o f  c a s t l e s  b y  i n d i v i d u a l s  
w a s  r e c o g n i z e d  o f f i c i a l l y  o n l y  a f t e r  t h e  I  0 7 0 s  
1 9  
a n d  t h a t  I s a a k i o s  d i d n ' t  o c c u p y  
a n y  i m p o r t a n t  p o s t  i n  t h e  a r m y  a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  w e  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  p r o b a b l e  h e  
c o u l d  m a k e  u s e  o f  t h i s  f o r t r e s s  i n  h i s  p o s i t i o n  a s  t h e  s e r v i n g  m i l i t a r y  
c o m m a n d e r .  T h e r e f o r e ,  h e  n e e d e d  t h e  v o l u n t a r y  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  d e f e n s e  c o r p s  i n  
t h e  c a s t l e  o r  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  i n  t h e  c a s t l e  t o w n  t o  u s e  t h i s  f o r t r e s s  a s  a  r e a r  b a s e  o f  
t h e  r e b e l l i o n .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a n o t h e r  c a s e  c a n  b e  p r e s e n t e d  t h a t  t h e  b o n d s  b e t w e e n  g e n e r a l  
a n d  h i s  m e n  c u l t i v a t e d  d u r i n g  a r m y  l i f e  d i d  n o t  l o s e  t h e i r  v i t a l i t y  e v e n  a f t e r  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  r e l a t i o n  w a s  e n d e d .  H e a r i n g  o f  I s a a k i o s '  r e v o l t  o u t b r e a k ,  K o s m a s ,  s o n  
o f  K o n i d i a r e s ,  a n  e x - s o l d i e r ,  a  m o n k  o f  M o u n t  G a l e s i o n ,  a b a n d o n e d  t h e  
m o n a s t i c  l i f e  t o  t a k e  p a r t  i n  t h e  r e b e l l i o n .  
2 0  
T o  s u m  u p  t h e  a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  i d e a  o f  a  c l e a r  
d i c h o t o m y  b e t w e e n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s o l d i e r s  w h o  w e r e  f a i t h f u l  a n d  r e l i a b l e ,  a n d  t h e  
r e g u l a r  i m p e r i a l  a r m y  w h o  w e r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m o b i l i z e ,  d o e s  n o t  a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t  
r e a l i t y .  I n  f a c t ,  p o w e r f u l  a r i s t o c r a t s  w e r e  a b l e  t o  a s s e r t  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  
p r o v i n c i a l  a r m y  t h r o u g h  v a r i o u s  n e t w o r k s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e i r  c o n n e c t i o n s  w i t h  l o c a l  
n o t a b l e s ,  w i t h  o f f i c e r s  i n  t h e  r e s e r v e s  a n d  w i t h  s e r v i n g  l e a d i n g  m i l i t a r y  s t a f f  
4 8  
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from their home province. The driving force of revolt was a provincial military 
corps that was called up by powerful aristocrats from all their social 
connections, particularly those of blood and homeland. 
II. The Reality of the Private Soldiers 
Powerful aristocrats servicing as military commanders were often observed 
to accompany their private militia.21 For instance, as Prof. Inoue also points out, 
Nikephoros Botaneiates, a participant in this revolt, had "his own guard corps" 
as the doux of Antioch in 1067.22 And, preceding this revolt, Katakalon 
Kekaumenos had fought with the Pechenegs with "his own small band of 
dependents and relatives" in l 049.23 
As seen above, armed retainers of powerful aristocrats appeared m 
historical sources as bands guarding their masters as military commanders. We 
can argue that their existence contributed to the appearance of powerful 
aristocrats as warriors and to their display of social prestige. 
On the other hand, on the basis of the part of the text in which they were 
mentioned, it is not clear whether they have closely united with the household of 
the aristocrats. If the powerful aristocrats in Asia Minor who joined the revolt of 
Isaakios Komnenos had two hats, as high-ranking military officials and as great 
landowners in the provinces, we can get impression that their private military 
corps were strongly connecting to the former aspect. 
Such an impression seems to be strengthened further by connecting various 
fragmentary clues. First, most of the retainers whose names can be confirmed 
were non-Greeks. Alexios Komnenos, serving as military commander, had three 
non-Greek followers, Tatikios the Turk, Chaskales the Alan and Traulos the 
"Manichaean" from Philippopolis.24 At the same time, Isaakios, Alexios' 
brother, also had an Alan servant called Arabates. 25 And, as widely known, 
Borilos and Germanos, two close advisers of Nikephoros Botaneiates, were 
"Skythai from Sklavonia" (possibly Bulgarians).26 The historian Bryennios 
called them "slaves" of Botaneiates and "fellows bought by money. "27 
Besides, as J.-C.Cheynet pointed out, many of servants were named in 
Eustathios Boil as' will in the middle of the 11th century and in that of the 
married couple of Symbatios Pakourianos and Kale in the 1 090s had the names 
of Caucasians or Pechenegs. According to the views of Cheynet, these non-
Greek servants of Boilas or Pakoulianos were originally prisoners of war. 28 And 
because the father of Tatikios, a faithful servant of Alexios Komnenos, had been 
a Turkish captive seized by Ioannes Komnenos, Alexios' father,29 Tatikios was 
the son of a prisoner of war. In the chronicle of the First Crusade, we can see 
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t h a t  T a t i k i o s '  n o s e  w a s  i n j u r e d .  
3 0  
A s s u m i n g  t h a t  T a t i k o s '  n o s e  w a s  c u t  o f f  a s  a  
c a p t i v e  i n  c h i l d h o o d ,  a s  C . M . B r a n d  s u g g e s t s ,  
3 1  
i t  i s  q u i t e  l i k e l y  t h a t  h e  w a s  a l s o  
e x - s l a v e .  A s  s e e n  e a r l i e r ,  t w o  " S k y t h a i " ,  c l o s e  a d v i s e r s  o f  B o t a n e i a t e s ,  w e r e  a l s o  
e x - s l a v e s .  T h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  b a n d  o f  f o l l o w e r s  o f  p o w e r f u l  a r i s t o c r a t s  m a y  h a v e  
b e e n  o c c u p i e d  b y  s u c h  n o n - G r e e k  p e o p l e  a s  p r i s o n e r s  o f  w a r  a n d  e x - s l a v e s .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  f o r e i g n  m e r c e n a r y  s o l d i e r s  s u c h  a s  A l a n s  s e r v i n g  t o  t h e  K o m n e n o i  
b r o t h e r s  w o u l d  j o i n  t h e m .  
A n d  e v e n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  G r e e k  r e t a i n e r s ,  t h e i r  h o m e l a n d s  d i d  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  m a s t e r ' s  e s t a t e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
G o u l e s ,  a  s e r v a n t  o f  A l e x i o s  K o m n e n o s  o r i g i n a t i n g  f r o m  K a s t a m o n ,  
P a p h l a g o n i a ,  c a m e  f r o m  C a p p a d o c i a .  
3 2  
I t  w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  h e  d i d n ' t  j o i n  t h e  b a n d  
o f  K o m n e n i a n  r e t a i n e r s  b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  b i r t h  i n  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  e s t a t e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  
m o s t  p r o b a b l e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  t w o  o f  t h e m  m e t  m u s t  b e  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  i t  s e e m s  t h a t  t h e  c o m m e n t  o f  J . - C .  C h e y n e t  r e f e r r i n g  
t o  t h e  b a n d s  o f  s e r v a n t s  o f  S y m b a t i o s  P a k o u l i a n o s  a n d  E u s t a t h i o s  B o i l a s ,  " i l s  
n '  e t a i e n t  d o n e  p a s  r e c r u t e s  l o c a l e m e n t  e t  n  ' e n t r a i e n t  p a s  a u  s e r v i c e  d e  l e u r  
m a i t r e  p a r  l e  b i a i s  d e  s o n  i n f l e n c e  s u r  l e s  p a y s a n s  d u  l i e u , "
3 3  
w a s  w i d e l y  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  b a n d s  o f  o t h e r  p o w e r f u l  a r i s t o c r a t s '  r e t a i n e r s .  
C h e y n e t  a s s u m e d ,  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t w o  c a s e s ,  t h a t  t h e  l o r d  o f  a n  e s t a t e  
m i g h t  m o b i l i z e  h i s  p e a s a n t s  a s  h i s  b a n d  o f  s u p p o r t e r s .  O n e  c a s e  i s  t h a t  o f  
B a s i l e i o s  S k l e r o s ,  p a t r i k i o s ,  a n d  h i s  p r i v a t e  v e n d e t t a  w i t h  P r o u s i a n o s ,  t h e  
s t r a t e g o s  o f  B o u k e l l a r i o i ,  u n d e r  t h e  r e i g n  o f  K o n s t a n t i n o s  V I I I  (  1 0 2 5 - 1  0 2 8 ) .  
3 4  
W . S e i b t ,  s t u d i e d  t h e  p r o s o p o g r a p h y  o f  t h e  S k l e r o i ,  a n d  a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e  p r i v a t e  
f o r c e  o f  S k l e r o s  c o n s i s t e d  o f  h i s  p a r o i k o i  ( d e p e n d e n t  p e a s a n t s ) .  
3 5  
C h e y n e t ,  a  
s k e p t i c  o f  t h i s  v i e w ,  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  s o u r c e s  t o  
a s s u m e  s u c h  a  m o b i l i z a t i o n .  
3 6  
A n d ,  a s  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t  e l s e w h e r e ,  i t  w a s  e v i d e n t  
t h a t  i m p r o m p t u  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  o r g a n i z e d  f r o m  p e a s a n t s  c o u l d  b e  n o  m a t c h  f o r  
t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a r m y .  
3 7  
A n o t h e r  c a s e  m e n t i o n e d  b y  C h e y n e t  w a s  t h a t  o f  t h e  
f u t u r e  e m p e r o r ,  B a s i l e i o s  I .  
3 8  
B u t  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a s  B a s i l e i o s  h a d  j o i n e d  a  b a n d  o f  
a r i s t o c r a t i c  r e t a i n e r s  a w a y  f r o m  h i s  h o m e ,  w e  c a n  n o t  r e c o g n i z e  f r o m  t h i s  c a s e  
t h a t  p e a s a n t s  w e r e  m o b i l i z e d  t o  t h e  b a n d  o f  a r i s t o c r a t i c  r e t a i n e r s  t h r o u g h  t h e  
l a t t e r ' s  h o u s e h o l d .  
O f  c o u r s e ,  s u c h  a  g r o u p  o f  p r i v a t e  s o l d i e r s  f o r m e d  f r o m  t h e  s t a t e  m i l i t a r y  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  m i g h t  b e  m a i n t a i n e d  b y  t h e i r  m a s t e r  i f  h e  w a s  t e m p o r a r i l y  r e t i r e d  
f r o m  h i s  m i l i t a r y  p o s t  a n d  h a d  o c c u p i e d  h i m s e l f  t o  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  h i s  e s t a t e .  
A t  t h a t  t i m e ,  t h i s  g r o u p  o f  p r i v a t e  s o l d i e r s ,  a s  " s o l d i e r s  o f  o n e  a r i s t o c r a t i c  
f a m i l y " ,  h a d  m a i d  o f  a  p a r t  o f  l a t t e r ' s  h o u s e h o l d  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  h o w  
s t r o n g  w e r e  s u c h  " s o l d i e r s  o f  a n  a r i s t o c r a t i c  f a m i l y " ?  W a s  t h e  f o r c e  s o  s t r o n g  
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that it could influence over the fate of the state? By referring to the study of J.-
C.Cheynet, we would like to try and find out the answer to this question. 
Through an analysis of the wills of Eustathios Boilas and Symbatios 
Pakourianos, Cheynet reached the following conclusions about the dimensions 
of their group of retainers: "ces personages d'une rang assez important, Bollas 
etait hypatos et protospathaire en I 059, Paskourianos, curopalates en I 090, ne 
disposaient sans doute pas de plus d 'une vingtaine de serviteurs males, nombre 
suffisant pour en imposer sur le plan local, mais pas de nature a inquieter les 
autorites. "39 
As Cheynet also agreed, these two were not men of the highest class in the 
state. Therefore, it is easily imaginable that an important figure such as the 
commander in chief of the army would have taken more followers. But even in a 
territorial feud between Romanos Skleros and Georgios Maniakes in the theme 
of Anatolikoi which was referred by Prof. Inoue as the example of the quarrel 
between two powerful owners of oikos, Cheynet assessed as "il est inutile de 
disposer de centaines d'hommes, pour de telles enterprises, toutes provincials, et 
il n 'y avait pas Ia matiere a inquieter les autorites imperials. "40 
In fact, according to an another study of Cheynet, as the forces of one army 
corps of a tagma consisting of professional soldiers were about 500-2000,41 it 
will be difficult to imagine that persons away from military posts could maintain 
private troops of a comparable level to the regular forces for the long term. It 
would have imposed a large economic burden to keep a great number of non-
productive personnel, no matter how wealthy the landowners were. Even for the 
very powerful aristocrats, it might have been enough to take as many as 50 
armed retainers to serve the purpose of bodyguard and to show off their social 
prestige. 
Compared with this, it seems exceptional that forces of I ,000 dependents 
were mobilized by Katakalon Kekaumenos. According to W. Treadgold, the total 
forces of Koloneia, separated from the Armeniakoi in about 861, were 3,000. 42 
As a matter of fact, the total forces of this theme must have decreased through 
the process of transformation to professional soldiers. As Skylitzes referred to 
this troop of Koloneia as a single unit, the forces of this army corps would be 
2,000 or less on the basis of Cheynet's above-mentioned view. In other word, 
Kekaumenos could collect a force of more than half of the regular army corps in 
his homeland solely by his own efforts. It might be difficult to assume such mass 
mobilization unless one supposes that the private troops of his kinsmen were 
mustered from a wide region beyond the limits of his homeland, or that regular 
soldiers in Koloneia were also included as his private "retainers". If other 
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aristocrats also formed their private soldiers on such a scale, the majority of men 
eligible for military service would be absorbed by them, and the regular imperial 
army's existence would have been threatened. 
After all, it is reasonable to suppose that aristocrats retiring from the 
military post and living on their estate only formed comparatively small 
numbers of retainers groups, which consisted of slave dependants for the most 
part. They were normally only taking small band of retainers, but in times of 
emergency, they could win the provincial army to their side by using their 
networks. This view opposes to that of Prof.lnoue, who insisted that every 
participant in Isaakios Komnenos' revolt owned powerful oikos and only the 
owners of such oikos played the principal roles in the revolt. In that case, we 
need to look for other factors taking the place of these oikos. Focusing on 
leading members of the revolt, we would like to try and clear up the reasons they 
could play such important roles. 
III. Ringleaders of the Rebellion 
According to Prof. Inoue's description, three commanders of the rebelling 
troops, Isaakios Komnenos, Katakalon Kekaumenos and Romanos Skleros, 
commanding the central forces, the left wing and the right wing in the battle of 
Haides respectively, "had an extensive oikos and participated in the rebellion 
with a large number of loyal retainers. "43 In his opinion, that was the reason why 
they were assigned to command the revel armies. Is this stance really 
appropriate? 
First of all, we need to confirm that the regional distribution of troops 
composing rebels was reflected in the allocation of such commands. That is to 
say, it is likely that Isaakios Komnenos, the commander of the central forces, 
leaded the armies of his homeland Paphlagonia, and Katakalon Kekaumenos, 
commander of the left wing, Koloneia, Sebasteia, Melitene, Tephrike and other 
Armenian provinces under his command. It is clear that Romanos Skleros, the 
commander of the right wing, leads the troops of his homeland Anatolokoi, as 
Nikephoros Botaneiates, who was also from the same province, joined these 
troops.44 In the next stage, we would like to investigate the real reason that 
these three people were represented as ringleaders in the rebellion. 
It is to Isaakios Komnenos that we first pay attention. As the basis of the 
argument that Isaakios "had an extensive oikos and ( ... ) a large number of loyal 
retainers", Prof. Inoue points out that the revolting armies had gathered in his 
oikos of Kastamon. However, is this description enough evidence that Isaakios 
had powerful oikos? As a matter of fact, there are no proven documents that 
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illustrate the scale of lsaakios' estates in Kastamon and how many retainers he 
could mobilize. 
Therefore, why was his estate chosen as the assembly place of the rebels? 
There are two conceivable reasons. The first reason is that he had already been 
chosen as a candidate for the emperor taking the lead of the revolting armies at 
the joint conspiracy in Constantinople. The second reason, however, might 
possibly be more important: Paphlagonia was the most convenient assembly 
place for the revolting armies, which would march against the capital after 
joining up with Kekaumenos' troops, advancing to the west from the eastern 
frontier zone, and the troops of the aristocrats of Anatolikoi such as Skleros and 
Bourtzes, who had their homeland in the central plateau of Anatolia. Viewed in 
this light, choosing an assembly place in Bithynia near the capital might have 
been avoided from the consideration that the rebels might meet with the 
counteroffensive of the imperial army before making proper preparations. 
Next, why did Isaakios Komnenos command the center armies of the 
rebels? Needless to say, it was his position as the imperial candidate that led him 
to lead the whole army. In other words, he was given the position of the most 
important commander because he was in the position of commander in chief of 
the rebels, and not because he had a grand estate or powerful group of retainers. 
However, Prof. Inoue's logic would be appropriate in the end if he had been 
elected as the imperial candidate because he had a distinguished and powerful 
household. So let us examine from Skylitzes' description the process where by 
plotting aristocrats elected the imperial candidate. 
According to Skylitzes, among all the people who concluded the pact, 
Kekaumenos obviously seemed to be more suitable for this duty than other men 
in the matter of his age (Yilpa), his manliness (dvopet<X.), and his experience 
(4t,7t£tpia.).45 However, Kekaumenos firmly refused this offer, and instead 
proposed to elect Isaakios Komnenos in place of him, and all of them agreed to 
this proposal. If we can believe Skylitzes' statement, the scale of the household 
organization did not appear in the criteria by which the imperial candidate was 
chosen. Moreover, it is necessary to keep in mind that Isaakios Komnenos had 
an important advantage over Katakalon Kekaumenos. Namely, he was born into 
a noble family who had been granted the favor of Basileios II (r.976-1025). 
Before this conspiracy, when Komnenos and Kekaumenos had an interview with 
Emperor Michael VI, it is said that the emperor praised Kekaumenos because he 
"obtained a position full of honors not because of his ancestors or someone's 
patronage but because of his own distinguished services. "46 Taken in another 
light, this remark might be seen as insulting Isaakios Komnenos, who had 
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famous ancestors and was treated warmly by successive emperors. There is no 
doubt that Isaakios Komnenos, as a man of brilliant military career and noble 
linage, was more suitable to lead the revolting armies, containing various 
elements, rather than Kekaumenos, a self-made man. 
Next, let us look at Katakalon Kekaumenos. If we are to believe Skylitzes' 
remarks, he occupied the position next to Komnenos in co-rebels. Moreover, he 
was a commander- in- chief of troops mobilized from the east frontier zone. So 
it would be quite natural that the command of the left wing, which would be 
usually entrusted to the second person in the army, had been granted to him. 
Rather, we should note that when dividing the rebels into three 
geographical parts, as mentioned above, there was no mention of the another 
participants of the rebellion, with the sole exception of Ioannes Komnenos, 
brother of Isaakios, as regards Isaakios Komnenos' troops of Paphlagonia, and 
Kekaumenos' of the east frontier zone. Compared with this, as regards the 
aristocrats of Anatolikoi, several persons' names were enumerated, as I will 
describe later. What was the reason for the difference? 
In my opinion, as regards the former two groups, it is likely that Skylitzes 
intended to stress the importance of the roles which Komnenos and Kekaumenos 
had played in their armies. In other words, he might have enumerated a lot of 
names as regards the Anatolikoi because such a deliberation was useless. First of 
all, let us examine Katakalon Kekaumenos concerning this point. 
It is well known that the last part of Skylitzes' chronicle reported on 
Kekaumenos' deeds in detail, and presented itself as if he had been a substantial 
leading player. 47 Accordingly to J. Shepard, Skylitzes might have used 
Kekaumenos' personal memoirs for these parts. 48 It seems that Skylitzes' 
descriptions, which exclusively focus on the efforts of Kekaumenos in the 
process of mobilization of rebelling armies in the surrounding areas of Koloneia, 
and did not mention any rebels from these regions other than him, might be 
caused by the character of such an original source. 
Next, what can we say about lsaakios Komnenos? As to him, the situation 
in which Skylitzes wrote his history might seem to have had an influence on his 
attitude. The hypothesis of S. A. Kamer49 is very interesting on this point. He 
pointed out that Skylitzes had stressed a false accusation maid against 
Nikephoros Komnenos for his so-called intrigue in 1026. Kamer assumed that 
Skylitzes, writing his history after the birth of the Komnenian dynasty, had 
depended on sources friendly to the Komnenos family. The same thing may be 
said of this historian's stance, which explains in detail the heroic deed of Manuel 
Erotikos, a grandfather of Alexios I, who was defending Nikaia at the time of the 
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I f  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  K a m e r  i s  a c c e p t e d ,  i t  m i g h t  b e  v e r y  n a t u r a l  t o  s u p p o s e  
t h a t  a  s i m i l a r  d e l i b e r a t i o n  f u n c t i o n e d  w h e n  S k y l i t z e s  w a s  w r i t i n g  a b o u t  t h i s  
r e v o l t ,  w h i c h  h e  p l a c e d  a s  t h e  f i n a l  e v e n t  o f  h i s  c h r o n i c l e  a n d  w h i c h  w a s  a  
m e m o r a b l e  o n e  a s  i t  s a w  t h e  f i r s t  a c c e s s i o n  t o  t h e  t h r o n e  b y  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
K o m n e n o s  f a m i l y .  F o r  S k y l i t z e s ,  I s a a k i o s  K o m n e n o s  w a s  a n  o b j e c t  t h a t  s h o u l d  
b e  s t r e s s e d  b y  a l l  m e a n s  p o s s i b l e ,  a l o n g  w i t h  h i s  o t h e r  h e r o ,  K e k a u m e n o s .  I n  
p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h i s ,  o t h e r  r e v o l t i n g  a r i s t o c r a t s  i n  P a p h l a g o n i a  w o u l d  f a d e  i n t o  t h e  
b a c k g r o u n d .  V i e w e d  i n  t h i s  l i g h t ,  w e  c a n  u n d e r s t a n d  w h y  S k y l i t z e s  r e f e r r e d  t o  
I o a n n e s  K o m n e n o s ,  I s a a k i o s '  b r o t h e r ,  s o  u n n a t u r a l l y .  H e  c o u l d  n o t  o m i t  t h e  
n a m e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  o f  t h e  r e i g n i n g  e m p e r o r  o f  h i s  t i m e  ( A l e x i o s  I ) .  
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  n o n e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  a r i s t o c r a t i c  f a m i l i e s  a r o u n d  P a p h l a g o n i a  w h o  
w e r e  t h o u g h t  t o  h a v e  j o i n e d  t o  t h i s  r e b e l l i o n  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  K o m n e n o i  w e r e  e v e r  
m e n t i o n e d  b y  S k y l i t z e s .  A s  a n  e x a m p l e ,  l e t  u s  t a k e  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  b r o t h e r s ,  
K o n s t a n t i n o s  a n d  I o a n n e s  i n  t h e  D o u k a s  f a m i l y ,  w h o  w e r e  k n o w n  a s  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
i n  t h e  p e t i t i o n i n g  o f  M i c h a e l  V I  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l .  T h e  e l d e r  b r o t h e r  K o n s t a n t i n o s ,  
w a s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  r e m a i n e d  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  a n d  i n c i t e d  c i v i l  u p r i s i n g ,  a s  P r o f .  
I n o u e ' s  s u p p o s i t i o n .
5 1  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  y o u n g e r  b r o t h e r  I o a n n e s  w a s  
n e v e r  m e n t i o n e d  b y  S k y l i t z e s  a g a i n ,  a l t h o u g h  h e  m i g h t  h a v e  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  
r e b e l l i o n  a s  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  D o u k a s  f a m i l y .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  S . A .  K a m e r ,  N i k e t a s  P e g o n i t e s ,  I o a n n e s  D o u k a s '  f a t h e r - i n -
l a w ,  w h o  a l s o  h a d  h i s  h o m e l a n d  i n  P a p h l a g o n i a ,  a p p e a r s  t o  h a v e  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  
t h i s  r e v o l t .
5 2  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  a r t i c l e  o f  H . G r e g o i r e
5 3  
w h i c h  h e  q u o t e d  a s  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  h i s  a r g u m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h i s  v i e w  w a s  b a s e d  o n  a  c e r t a i n  
P i z s h o n i t ,  w h o  a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  t e x t  o f  M a t t h e w  o f  E d e s s a .  H o w e v e r ,  w h e n  
r e a d i n g  t h e  o r i g i n a l  t e x t  o f  M a t t h e w ,  w e  f i n d  t h a t  t h i s  P i z s h o n i t  a n d  L i p a r i t ,  h i s  
c o l l e a g u e ,  w e r e  p e r s o n s  w h o  w e n t  t o  g i v e  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  e m p e r o r  M i c h a e l  V I ,  
b u t  k n o w i n g  o f  t h e  v i c t o r y  o f  t h e  r e b e l s ,  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  n e w  e m p e r o r .  
5 4  
A s  
T h e o d o r o s  P e g o n i t e s  o c c u p i e d  t h e  p o s t  o f  t h e  g o v e r n o r  o f  E d e s s a  u n d e r  t h e  
r e i g n  o f  K o n s t a n t i n o s  X ,  t h e  s u c c e s s o r  o f  I s a a k i o s  I ,  
5 5  
w e  c a n  c o n f i r m  t h a t  t h e  
a l l i a n c e  o f  t h e  P e g o n i t a i  a n d  t h e  D o u k a i  h a d  c o n t i n u e d  u n t i l  t h i s  t i m e .  I n  t h i s  
c o n n e c t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  w a s  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  b y  t h e  P e g o n i t a i  i n  
t h i s  r e v o l t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  o u r  v i e w  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  n e v e r  c o n f i r m e d ,  w h i c h  
g o e s  a g a i n s t  K a m e r ' s  s u p p o s i t i o n .  
S k y l i t z e s  d i d  n o t  m e n t i o n  t h e  D o k e i a n o i  a n d  t h e  K o n t o s t e p h a n o i ,  r e l a t e d  
f a m i l i e s  o f  t h e  K o m n e n o i ,  e i t h e r .  I t  i s  q u i t e  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  K o n t o s t e p h a n o i  w h i c h  
h a d  o c c u p i e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  m i l i t a r y  p o s t  u n d e r  t h e  r e i g n  o f  K o n s t a n t i n o s  I X  
M o n o m a c h o s  ( r . 1 0 4 2 - 1 0 5 5 ) ,
5 6  
l i k e  I s a a k i o s  K o m n e n o s  a n d  K e k a u m e n o s ,  
V o l .  X L I  2 0 0 6  
5 5  
belonged to the group of generals eliminated by the government of Michael VI. 
Moreover, Kontostephanos, a nephew of the emperor, had borne the high title of 
magistros under the reign of Isaakios I. 57 Viewed in this light, it seems quite 
probable that the Kontostephanoi had joined to this rebellion. However, 
Skylitzes ignored their existence. The same applies to the case of Theodoros 
Dokeianos, whose mother was a sister of Isaakios Komnenos and who bore also 
the title of magistros under the latter's reign. 58 
Various families, such as the Pegonitai, the Kontostephanoi and the 
Dokeianoi, whose properties had not confiscated by the authorities in contrast 
with the Dalassenoi, and had thus been able to keep the stable households, left 
no traces in the descriptions of Skylitzes. In this case, we must be aware of the 
reasoning of Skylitzes, who tried to stress Isaakios Komnenos' prominent 
position in the Paphlagonia. From this viewpoint, it seems it was not very 
surprising that the Dalassenoi had not been mentioned. From what has been 
discussed above, we can conclude that the lack of powerful oikos was not a 
decisive factor in their absences. It was established beforehand that all 
aristocrats around Paphlagonia, other than the Komnenoi, were destined to be 
ignored by Skylitzes whether they had powerful oikos or not. 
However, Skylitzes referred to several persons' names regarding the 
aristocrats of Anatolikoi, because they had no connections to such regulations. 
Thus, when he talked about the escape of the aristocrats of the Anatolikoi to 
Kastamon, he noted the names of ''proedros Romanos Skleros, Bourtzes, 
Botaneiates and sons of Basileios Argyros. "59 
In that case of the aristocrats of Anatolikoi, why was the command of the 
right wing of the rebels entrusted to Romanos Skleros as their head? Prof. Inoue 
insists as usual that the private military forces of Skleros in his estates were a 
decisive factor. 60 However, W. Seibt presents another account regarding this 
point.61 According to Seibt, Skleros was given the key role because he had borne 
the highest title in the rebels. In fact, while his title was proedros, as mentioned 
above, Isaakios Komnenos and Katakalon Kekaumenos were only magistros at 
that time. 
In this connection, we perceive the curious fact regarding the description of 
Skylitzes concerning Romanos Skleros. In Skylitzes' text, Skleros dose not 
appear in the description of the petition of the generals to the emperor in 1057. 
Skleros would be mentioned a top of the list of escaping aristocrats for the first 
time in the above-mentioned description, in which Skylitzes reports the total 
evacuation of the aristocrats of Anatolikoi to Isaakios Komnenos' estate. In this 
case, Skylitzes added the clarification as for Skleros, as follows: "because he(= 
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Skleros) was not excluded from the people exchanging the oath. "62 
Perhaps it seems that Romanos Skleros had been one of the plotting 
members from the first. However, given that Skylitzes does not refer to his 
presence among the members of the petitioning generals in the spring, and 
mentions him at the break up of the rebellion for the first time, what was behind 
this difference? Almost certainly, it is his high title. Skylitzes had a habit of 
listing people in order of their titles when he needed to list several peoples' 
names. I would like to give a few examples. It was "magistros Isaakios 
Komnenos, magistros Katakalon Kekaumenos, vestarches Michael Bourtzes and 
Konstantinos and Ioannes, descendents of the eastern blanch of the Doukai" who 
petitioned the emperor in 1057.63 According to Skylitzes, the envoy dispatched 
to the rebels by the emperor Michael VI consisted of "proedros Konstantinos 
Leichoudes, proedros Theodoros Alopos, Konstantinos Psellos, hypatos of 
philosophers. "64 In the same way, when Skylitzes listed the names of senators 
who had roused themselves to action in the capital, he referred to them in order 
of "magistros Michael, the son of Anastasios, patrikios Theodoros Chryserios, 
patrikios Christophoros Pyrros. "65 
Therefore, if Romanos Skleros had appeared in the petition to the emperor 
Michael VI in the spring of 1057 according to this custom, Skylitzes would be 
compelled to place Skleros at the top of the generals. In addition, it was possible 
that Romanos Skleros might have been a real leader of the generals at this stage. 
However, such a scheme was extremely inconvenient for Skylitzes, who wanted 
to represent Isaakios Komnenos and Katakalon Kekaumenos as the leaders of 
generals. So it is likely that Skylitzes deliberately said nothing of Skleros' 
presence at first, and only finally referred to him after the breaking up of the 
revolt. 
I would like to summarize the findings obtained from these considerations. 
The first point we can note is that the three commanders leading rebelling 
armies were representatives of the three regions that supplied forces to the 
rebels. The troops of Paphlagonia and the surrounding area entered under the 
command of Isaakios Komnenos. Katakalon Kekaumenos led the armies of 
Koloneia and the Armenian provinces of the eastern frontier zone. And it was an 
army in the Anatolikoi, his homeland, that Romanos Skleros led. 
The second point, we can note is division of the participants of the 
rebellion into the three above-mentioned groups. While there were no mentions 
of aristocratic families other than Komnenos and Kekaumenos with regards 
Paphlagonia and Koloneia, it is only for the Anatolikoi that several mentions 
were confirmed. On this point we need to discern the tactics of Skylitzes, who 
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tried to stress the prominent positions of Komnenos and Kekaumenos for the 
former two groups. 
As the third point, it is impossible to demonstrate the view that assumes the 
possession of a powerful household organization as the reason to choose the 
three aristocrats as representatives of each region, at least based on historical 
sources. It was a consequence of consideration of numerous conditions, such as 
age, military career, and popularity that Isaakios Komnenos and Katakalon 
Kekaumenos were recommended as the candidate for emperor. The number of 
private soldiers whom they disposed was not counted in this case. In the same 
way, there is no evidence to prove that Romanos Skleros had a powerful band of 
private soldiers compared with other aristocrats in the Anatolikoi. On the other 
hand, it was clear that he surpassed the other aristocrats of the Anatolikoi due to 
his honorary title. 
The Rebellion of Isaakios Komnenos: a Conclusion 
Finally, let us summarize the entire argument. 
In this rebellion, it was not the aristocrats' private soldiers that formed the 
main force of the rebels. It was regular armies stationed in provinces connected 
through various networks with the revolting aristocrats of Asia Minor that 
played the main role, and the greater part of the troops which brought victory to 
the rebels in the battle of Haides probably consisted of the regular army. 
On the other hand, it seems that the role of the aristocrats' private soldiers 
was extremely limited. Based on various circumstantial evidence, it is possible 
that their role might not have exceeded that of master's bodyguard. 
Our final conclusion is that the number of aristocrats' private soldiers was 
not the decisive factor in selecting the leaders of the revolting armies. Certainly, 
it is impossible to prove it from historical sources. The rebellion of Isaakios 
Komnenos was the one of generals who could mobilize military forces stationed 
in Asia Minor. The precedence of leaders in the rebellion greatly depended on 
their careers in the state apparatus, such as their honorary titles and past military 
exploits. On the other hand, we could not determine any evidence that the scale 
of their household was considered. 
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